A Proposal for a Structural Remedy for Illegal Collusion
2018, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 82, No.1, 2018, p.335-359
"The good news is that competition authorities are regularly detecting and
convicting cartels. The bad news is that competition authorities are regularly
detecting and convicting cartels. That cartels continue to form is striking in
light of the impressive list of advancements in enforcement in the last three decades.
Getting the Deal Through - Cartel Regulation 2018 - Hong Kong
2017, Getting the Deal Through - Cartel Regulation 2018
"Section 6 of the Competition Ordinance 2012 (Cap 619 of the Laws of Hong Kong) (the Ordinance) prohibits cartel conduct in Hong Kong. The substantive provisions came into effect on 14 December 2015.
The Competition Commission (the Commission) and the Communications Authority (CA) issued six guidelines under the Ordinance on 27 July 2015 (the Guidelines). The Guidelines provide guidance on how the Commission and the CA intend to interpret and apply the provisions of the Ordinance. In ...
Hong Kong Competition Commission's First Legal Action: An Economic Perspective
2017, International Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 2, 2017, p.11-13
"Hong Kong passed its first comprehensive competition law ('Competition Ordinance') in June 2012, and the law came into full effect in December 2015. On March 23, 2017, the Hong Kong Competition Commission ('HKCC') took its first legal action and filed a complaint against five firms in the information technology ('IT') industry with the Competition Tribunal.
The Perks of Being a Whistleblower: Designing Efficient Leniency Programs in New Antitrust Jurisdiction
2017, 50 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 5 (2017)
"In 1978, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) introduced a new method to detect cartels known as the Corporate Leniency Policy. The rationale behind the system, also referred to as amnesty or immunity program, was rather straightforward: the DOJ would vow not to punish a company involved in an illegal cartel in exchange
for a confession and cooperation which would enable the indictment of other cartel members. Although the policy was largely unused in its original formulation, it plan ...
When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?
2016, Wiley Periodicals
"This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary
aftermarket. When firms' aftermarkets are completely isolated from foremarket competition, they
cannot tacitly collude more easily than single-product firms. However, when their aftermarket power
is contested by foremarket competition as equipment owners view new equipment as a substitute
for their incumbent firms aftermarket product, profitable tacit collusion is sustainable among a
Long-Lived Consumers, Intertemporal Bundling, and Collusion
2011, Wiley Periodicals
"In a repeated price game with long but finitely-lived consumers, long-term contracts facilitate collusion. Intertemporal bundling reduces the gains from business stealing but has little effect on the cost of the resulting price war. When consumers anticipate future price wars, the maximum deviation profit is a single period of consumer surplus
per consumer. Hence long-term contracts do not increase the incentive to deviate per consumer, but do reduce the the number of consumers currently in th ...
Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion
2011, Wiley Periodicals
"Using a dynamic overlapping-generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat-purchase prices or fixed repeat-purchase discounts. We find
that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the ...